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NOTES
THE FEDERAL MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY ACT IN NO-FAULT
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE JURISDICTIONS:
EXTENSION OF THE FEDERAL RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT AGAINST
NO-FAULT INSURERS
Since Massachusetts enacted the first no-Fault automobile insurance stat-
ute ' in 1970, numerous states have adopted similar legislation.2 Such stat-
utes are intended to reduce the number of litigated cases which have bur-
dened court systems in jurisdictions that rely upon a fault determination in
tort before a party may receive compensation for injuries arising from an
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 90, §§ 34A-340 (West 1969 & Supp. 1979).
2 Twenty-three states have now enacted some form of no-fault automobile
insurance law. For a compilation of these statutes, see notes 51 k 58 infra. These laws
fall into three general categories:
a. Pure no-fault—These statutory schemes theoretically would abolish all
tort liability and rely solely on no-fault benefits to compensate injured per-
sons. Although no state has gone as far as complete abrogation of tort
liability for automobile drivers, the use of a highly restrictive threshold in
Michigan has severely limited the right to sue in tort for automobile acci-
dent injuries. Michigan grants the right to sue in tort only if a narrative
threshold is satisfied (a narrative threshold describes the type of injury that
must be sustained before the right to sue arises): "noneconomic loss if the.
injured person suffered death, serious impairment of body function or
permanent serious disfigurement." Mien. STAT. ANN. § 24.13135 (Supp.
1979). Along with such a severe limitation on the right. to sue, the statute
provides for unlimited no-fault benefits for medical expense. MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 24.13107 (Stipp. 1979). Severe or complete abrogation of tort liabil-
ity and generous benefits are characteristic of a pure no-fault system.
b. Modified no-fault—These statutory schemes usually modify the right to
sue in tort through the use of less restrictive thresholds. The statutory
threshold is either a dollar threshold stating the mi nimum out-of-pocket.
loss necessary to sue in tort, a narrative threshold describing the types and
extent of injury, or a combination of the two. Modified no-fault plans pro-
vide a range of medical benefits from $2,000 to unlimited liability for no-
fault insurers.
c. Add-on no-fault—These statutory schemes typically provide no-fault
benefits in addition to the usual liability insurance found in fault based
jurisdictions. Such a scheme is not a no-fault system in the true sense be-
cause there is no limitation on the right to sue in tort. Instead, such sys-
tems are more like a fault based system with an expanded form of medical
payments insurance. Medical payments insurance, operative in every fault
based jurisdiction, pays medical expense of injured parties without regard
to fault. Add-on plans typically result in higher insurance premiums since
1) they provide larger benefits for injured persons than medical payments
insurance in fault based states, and 2) the insurer must continue to charge
the usual premiums for liability insurance since there is no abrogation of
tort liability.
For an exhaustive survey of no-fault insurance, see Note, No-Fault Automobile In-
surance: An Evaluative Survey, 30 RuTGERs L. REV. 909 (1977).
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accident.' The difficult. inquiry into causation and fault required by the law
in "tort liability" jurisdictions is replaced in no-fault jurisdictions by a system
of insurance benefits,that provides for prompt recompense to persons injured,
in automobile accidents. 4
 The only determination to be made is one of con-
tractual entitlement to the benefits. 5 Whatever the societal advantage created
by no-fault automobile accident injury reparation systems, the recent adoption
of such statutes in a number of states has caused difficulty regarding claims
by the United States under the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act. 5
The federal government is required by statute to provide free medical
care to injured members of the United States armed forces.' Entitlement to
such medical care arises not only when a servicemember is injured while on
 but, also arises from injuries that occur during off duty hours—in this
case while driving or riding in an automobile." Because the federal govern-
ment is not an insurer of persons injured in automobile accidents," it normally
will seek recovery of the expense it incurs on behalf of the injured ser-
vicemember from any negligent third parties responsible for the injury or
from any insurance company liable to pay medical benefits to the injured
servicemember under a policy. To authorize recovery from negligent third
parties, Congress enacted the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act in 1962. 11
The Act provides for a governmental right of reimbursement whenever the
United States provides medical care to an injured person whose injuries arise
out of "circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person."" This
language, which predates enactment of any no-fault insurance statute, limits
the right of recovery to situations where state law imposes tort liability upon
some negligent person." Thus, the right of recovery granted in the literal
language of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act is not triggered when
there is no tort liability imposed by state law.
The lack of a tortfeasor under no-fault reparation systems arguably has
impaired the right of recovery under the Federal Medical Care Recovery stat-
3 See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.39-010 (Supp. 1978); see also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, 1009.102 (Purdon Stipp, 1979). See generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNEL ► ,
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 2 (1965),
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.39-010 (Supp. 1978): see also PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 40, § 1009.102 (Purdun Supp. 1979).
5 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13105 (Supp. 1979).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1976).
7
 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087 (1976).
8
 Medical care is provided to all active duty servicemembers. See text accom-
panying notes 21 & 22 infra.
" 10 U.S.C. § 1071 (1976). The national defense purpose of providing free
medical care to qualified individuals is found in this provision: "The purpose of sec-
tions 1071-1087 of this title is to create and maintain high morale in the uniformed
services by providing an improved and uniform program of medical and dental care
for members and certain former members of those services, and for their depen-
dents." Id.
1 " 42 U.S.C. §§ 2651-2653 (1976). Obviously. once a third party is adjudged
liable under state law, his insurance company will be liable to the United States under
the indemnification policy with the tort leasor.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1976).
" Id.
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ute. In addition to asserting a right of recovery under the Act, the federal
government has pursued nonstatutory bases for reimbursement of the ex-
pense of medical care it has incurred on behalf of the injured ser-
vicemember." The principal nonstatutory theory utilized by the government
is a third party beneficiary contractual argument. Specifically, the United
States claims to be an intended third party beneficiary of a no-fault insurance
contract betweeli the servicemember and the insurance carrier. This theory
has had varied success. Many courts have held that the United States is a third
party beneficiary of the state no-fault statute or the insurance contract en-
tered pursuant to the statute, or both." Thus, the United States has with
some success preserved its right of recovery by basing its claim outside the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act in contract rather than inside the Act in
tort.
There are, however, a number of courts in no-fault jurisdictions that have
rejected attempts by the government to claim a right of reimbursement either
under the Act or upon a nonstatutory third party beneficiary theory. One
view is that the United States' right of recovery under the Federal Medical
Care Recovery Act is extinguished in a state that has abolished tort liability
pursuant to a modified no-fault insurance plan." Another view seems to be
that the United States has no right to be reimbursed unless the injured party
receiving medical care from the government legally incurs the medical ex-
pense." These conflicting judicial responses to varied fact patterns have con-
fused and clouded the underlying governmental right to reimbursement. It is
the thesis of this note that the United States government should be entitled to
reimbursement for the expenses it has incurred on behalf of the insured
under a no-fault automobile insurance contract. In order to carry out such a
policy, it is submitted that courts should apply the underlying legislative intent
of the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act and allow federal recovery of med-
ical expense from no-fault insurers as a mandatory third party beneficiary of
the no-fault insurance contract. Additionally, it is suggested that Congress, to
make explicit its intent, should amend the Act to ensure reimbursement for
the benefit of the federal treasury.
Thus, this note first will review the federal recovery of medical expense
in fault based systems prior to the adoption of no-fault insurance statutes.
Second, it will survey the impact of no-fault statutes upon the federal recovery
right, focusing upon courts' treatment of both the Federal Medical Care Re-
covery Act and the third party beneficiary theory under no-fault insurance
laws. Finally, the note will propose that judicial acceptance of the federal right -
13 See, e.g., Medical Care Claims, 32 C.F.R. § 757.2 (1979).
14 See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Rozmyslowicz, 449 F. Supp. 68
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), gild sub nom. United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 605
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Leonard, 448 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1978);
United States v. Criterion Ins. Co.,—Colo.---, 596 P.2d 1203 (1979).
Hohman v. United States. 470 F. Supp. 769, 771 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Holzman is
discussed in text beginning at note 80 infra.
" See Sanner v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 150 N.J. Super. 488, 376
A.2d 180 (1977), affd per curiam, 75 N.J. 460, 383 A.2d 429 (1978). Sanner is discussed
in text beginning at note 190 infra.
626	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:6`23
of recovery in no-fault jurisdictions is required by compelling public policy
considerations and that an amendment to the Federal Medical Care Recovery
Act would be appropriate.
L BACKGROUND: MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY PRIOR TO THE
ADOPTION OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE LAWS
The operation of the federal recovery right was effectively and consis-
tently applied in every state" until the enactment of no-fault insurance laws.
In order to illustrate how federal medical recovery has been affected by no-
fault legislation, it is necessary first to understand the basic federal recovery
right as it is implemented in fault based jurisdictions. This section will
examine the independent right of recovery granted to the government in the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act (FMCRA or Act)." Additionally, it will
outline the various methods available to the United States to enforce the right.
of recovery under the Act as well as the third party beneficiary theory which
is available as an alternative method of recovery outside the FMCRA.
The FMCRA enables the United States to recover from negligent third
parties responsible for injuries to servicemembers the reasonable value of
medical care''' furnished to these beneficiaries of federal medical care stat-
utes.'" Under federal statutes, a servicemember who is on active duty is enti-
17
 Bernzweig, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Federal
Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 CoLum. L. REV. 1257, 1262-63 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Bernzweig].
" 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1976). Section 2651(a) provides in relevant extract:
In any case in which the United States is authorized or required by law to
furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment ... to a
person who is injured or suffers a disease, after the effective date of this
Act, under circumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person
... to pay damages therefor, the United States shall have a right to recover
from said third person the reasonable value of the care and treatment so
furnished or to he furnished and shall, as to this right be subrogated to
any right or claim that the injured or diseased person ... has against such
third person to the extent of the reasonable value of the care and treat-
ment so furnished or to be furnished.
'" 42 U.S.C. § 2652(a) (1976). "The President may prescribe regulations
with respect to the determination and establishment of the reasonable value of the
hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment (including prostheses and
medical appliances) furnished or to be furnished." Id.
President John F. Kennedy, through Executive Order, delegated authority to pre-
scribe such regulations to the Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management
and Budget). Exec. Order No. 11,060, 3 C.F.R. § 651 (1959-1963 Compilation), re-
printed in 42 U.S.C. § 2652 (1976).
A third party tortfeasor may not challenge the medical, surgical and dental rates
prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget on the grounds of unreasonable-
ness. United States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 14 (E.D. Va. 1967); Phillips v. -frame,
252 F. Supp. 948, 951 (E .D. Ill. 1966).
20
 The need for the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act arose out of United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947), in which the United
States Supreme Court denied that any right of the government to reimbursement
existed in federal common law. Id. at 314. The Court went on to note that. Congress
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tied to receive medical and dental care in any facility of any of the uniformed
services. 2 ' If an active duty servicemember is treated at a civilian medical
facility, the cost of the medical care is paid directly by the United States."
Accordingly, when the United States incurs medical expense on behalf of one
of these qualified individuals and the injury is caused by a negligent third
party, the government may assert a claim against the tortfeasor for reim-
bursement for the value of the medical care furnished.
The FMCRA creates an independent cause of action in the United States
for recovery of the expense of medical care." This independent right is
coexistent with the injured party's right of action against the tortfeasor for
other elements of damage such as loss of earning capacity or pain and suffer-
ing. 24 The right of recovery under the FMCRA is implemented by a subro-
gation of the United States to the rights of the injured party to the extent of
the value of the medical care." The right of subrogation attaches to the
substantive rights in tort which the injured party may have against the
tortfeasor under state law. 26 Generally, however, the right of the United
was certainly aware that injuries to soldiers caused by tortfeasors resulted in losses to
the federal treasury when medical care was provided pursuant to federal statute. Id. at
315. The Court held that it was a matter of federal fiscal policy which lay entirely in
the hands of Congress to whom the Constitution delegated financial responsibility for
the United States. Id. at 316-17. The purpose of the Act was thus to provide an
explicit right of recovery for the United Stales against persons liable under state law
for injuries to beneficiaries of federal medical care statutes in order to restore such lost
funds to the treasury. For the legislative history of the FMCRA, see S. REP. No. 1945,
87th Cong.. 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [19621 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 2637 [here-
inafter cited as SENATE RePoird. For an analysis of the FMCRA and the legislative
intent of Congress, see Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1259-61.
21 10 U.S.C. § 11)74 (1976). Similar medical and dental care is authorized for
retired armed forces personnel, as well as the dependents of both active duty and
retired personnel if such space in a medical facility of the uniformed services is avail-
able. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1074 & 1076 (1976).
22 Medical Care Claims, 32 C.F.R. § 757.3(h) (1979), authorizes direct payment
of civilian medical expenses incurred by active duty naval personnel. The other milit-
ary branches have similar regulations. Retired armed forces personnel and dependents
of both active duty and retired personnel are entitled to have a portion of their medi-
cal expenses paid under the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed
Services if' they are treated in a civilian medical facility. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1079-1086 (1976).
23 United States v. York. 398 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Merri-
gan, 389 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1968); United States v. Thomas Jefferson Corp., 309 F.
Supp. 1246 (W.D. Va. 1970); United States v. Nation, 299 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. Okla.
1969); United States v. Winter, 275 F. Supp. 895 (E.D. Pa. 1967); United States v.
Wittrock, 268 F. Supp. 325 (F.D. Pa. 1967); Lefebvre v. Government Employees Ins.
Co., 110. N.H. 23, 259 A.2(1 133 (1969); Avery v. Scott, 216 So. 2(1 111 (La. App.
1968).
See also Claims for the Reasonable Value of Medical Care Furnished by the Army,
32 C.F.R. § 537.22(a) (1979); see generally Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1259-61.
24 United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 980 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See
Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1261.
2 ' United States v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 979 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See
Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1259.
2" United States v. Studivant. 529 F.2d 673, -676 (3d Cir. 1976); United States
v. Haynes, 445 F.2d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1971); Lefebvre v. Government Employees Ins.
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States to recompense is not frustrated by procedural aspects which could de-
feat the injured party's right of action under state law. 27 For example, al-
though the injured party's claim for other damages may be barred by a state
statute of limitations, the independent right of recovery would not be bar-
red. 2 m
The FMCRA protects the government's right. of reimbursement against.
the injured party retaining medical expense damages from the tortfeasor. In
an action against the tortfeasor in almost every fault based jurisdiction, the
injured party may plead and receive damages under the collateral source doc-
trine for the value of medical care rendered, even when the medical services
were furnished without charge from a third person. 25 If the injured ser-
vicemember were allowed to recover damages from the tortfeasor for the
medical care, once the damages were paid over to the servicemember, the
tortkasor's obligation would be extinguished."" The collateral source rule
thus would frustrate the government's right of recovery by relieving the
tortfeasor of liability without placing the medical care damages in the United
States' hands."' The FMCRA, however, takes the right of recovery which the
plaintiff has against the tortfeasor and transfers it to the United States. 32 The
injured party may not himself have a cause of action against the tortfeasor for
damages relating to the medical care furnished by the United States.'" The
FMCRA, therefore, protects the United States' right of recovery by subrogat-
ing the government to the injured party's right of action for medical care
damages, and the independent right ensures that the United States will re-
cover those damages for the value of medical care which otherwise would fall
into the hands of the injured party as a double recovery. 34
(:o., 110 N.H. 23, 25, 259 A.2d 133, 135 (1969). See Beruzweig, supra note 17, at.
1262-63.
27 United States v. Moore, 469 F.2d 788, 794 (3d Cir. 1972) (interspousal im-
munity): United States v. Fort Henning Rifle and Pistol Club. 387 F.2(1 884, 887 (5th
Cir. 1967) (statute of limitations). See Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1263-64.
" United States v. Studivant, 529 F.2d 673. 675 (3d Cir. 1976): United States
v. Gera, 409 F.2d 117, 119-20 (3d Cir. 1969): United States v. Fort Henning Rifle and
Pistol Club, 387 F.2d 884, 887 (5th Cit•, 1967). •
29 DEPT. or HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE REPORT ON H.R. 298. reprinted
in [1962] U.S. Comm: CoNG. & An. NEws 2637. 2647. The collateral source doctrine
allows an injured person to recover the full measure of damages from the wrongdoer
regardless of any compensation recieved from a collateral source. "The reason for the
rule is that the wrongdoer must compensate the injured party for the injury he has
committed. without any reference to other compensation. In other words, if the de-
fendant is liable in damages, the extent of his liability is not to be measured by deduct-
ing financial benefits received by plaintiff from collateral sources. - Rayfield v. Law-
rence, 253 F.2d 2i/9, 213 (4th Cir. 1958).
3" See United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965) (settlement
and release by injured party barred recovery by United States under the Act).
3 ' See note 29 supra.
" Lefebvre v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 23, 25, 259 A.2d
133, 135 (1969).
33 United Slates v. Greene, 266 F. Supp. 976, 980 (N.D. III. 1967).
31 United States v. Leonard, 448 F. Stipp, 99, 101 (W.D,N.V. 1978); United
States v. Jones, 264 F. Supp. 11, 15 (F,.D. Va. 1967).
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The statute provides a number of methods by which the government may
pursue its independent cause of action. As one alternative, the United' States
can bring suit in its own name or in the name of the injured party. 3' The
government may also intervene or join the suit of the injured party against
the tortfeasor. 36 In addition, the United States may cause the injured party
to assign his cause of action to it to the extent of the United States' right to
recover medical expenses. 37 All of these methods, however, require that the
United States Attorney use government resources to press . the United States'
claim. A less expensive method would be to allow the injured servicemember
to represent not only his own claim for pain and suffering but also the gov-
ernment's medical care claim against the tortfeasor. 38 There is, however, a
problem with this method. Once the damages from judgment or settlement
for the medical care arc paid over to a plaintiff' representing the government's
claim, the explicit provisions of the FMCRA provide no requirement that the
injured party turn over those amounts to the government." Since the gov-
ernment's subrogation right is enforceable against the tortfeasor or his insur-
ance company but is not enforceable against the injured party, 4" the govern-
ment requests the injured party's attorney to represent the United States'
claim for medical expense and requires the attorney to sign an agreement
letter to turn over any damages received in the suit. 4 ' If the injured party
refuses to cooperate in representing the United States' claim, the United
States must directly join or intervene as a named party in the injured party's
action against the tortfeasor to protect its right to recovery. 42 All of these
methods ensure recompense to the United States and prevent a double recov-
ery by the injured party.
In fault based jurisdictions, the FMCRA is ineffective in obtaining gov-
ernmental recovery when the tortfeasor is judgment proof or where there is
35 42	 § 2651(b) (1976).
3" Id.
37 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1976).
liernzweig, supra note 17, at 1270 & n.86. Defendants have argued that the
statutory methods of enforcement are the only ones permissible. See, however, cases
cited at note 41 infra.
31 See COMPTROLLER GENERAL ol"rtn-: UNITED STATES REPORT ON H.R. 298,
reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2637, 2652.
4" United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965). See generally
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION	 162 (1937).
41 Most courts have construed the Act to permit the method of recovery de-
scribed in the text. Cook v. Stuples, 74 F.R.D. 370, 371-72 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Palmer
v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 343 F. Stipp. 692, 694-95 (F.D. Pa. 1972); Conley v. Maatuda,
303 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.N.H. 1969).
The letter of agreement is enforceable by the United States against the attorney.
Hanley v. Condrey, 467 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
Government regulations also provide for such a device. See 32 C.F.R. §§ 537.24(a),
757.5(e) (1979).
The attorney receives no compensation for this additional task of representation, 5
U.S.C. § 1306 (1976); the government, however, will assist the attorney in obtaining
military medical reports and other information concerning treatment of the injured
party.
Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1270 & n.86.
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no tortfeasor. Thus when the tortfeasor has no liability insurance, or the ser-
vicemember is at fault., the United States has relied upon contractual theories
to obtain reimbursement.'" The most important theory is one in which the
United States claims to be a third party beneficiary of the injtrred ser-
vicemember's insurance contract. The third party beneficiary theory has ena-
bled the United States to obtain recompense under the injured ser-
44vicemember's uninsured motorist coverage where the government could not
ohtain reimbursement from a judgment proof, uninsured tortfeasor. 4 " The
theory also has enabled. recovery under medical payments insurance's'' which
is payable without regard to fault of the injured party. 47 Thus, if the injured
party was at fault or involved in an accident, in which fault could not he de-
termined, the United States could not pursue a claim under the FMCRA, but
could still recover under the servicemember's medical payments policy as a
third party beneficiary. The use of this method has often enabled the federal
treasury to obtain repayment in cases in which the government could not have
pursued a claim under the FMCRA.
As long as states relied upon a fault based system to compensate parties
injured in automobile accidents, the FMCRA provided a satisfactory method
for the United States to recover medical expenses from third party
wrongdoers. Consistent application of the federal recovery right was possible
in every state because fault based jurisdictions imposed tort liability upon
4 ' See Army Regulations, 27-40 para. 5-I; 32 C.F.R. § 757.2(a) (1979); 32
C.F.R. §§ 842.141(a), 842.143(a) (1978).
44 Uninsured motorist coverage is a type of insurance which provideS benefits
to an insured accident victim in the event he is struck by a motorist carrying no liabil-
ity insurance. In this situation, since the tortfeasor has no insurance to pay for the
injured servicentember's medical expenses, the government asserts a claim as a third
party beneficiary of the. insured servicernember's uninsured motorist coverage.
45 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 836 (4th Cir.
1967); United States v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 320 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.
Cal. 1970) (recovery denied on other grounds); United States v. Commercial Union
Ins, Group, 294 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Transnational Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 19
Ariz. App. 354, 507 P.2d 693 (1973). Contra, United States v. Allstate, 306 F. Supp.
1214 (N.D. Fla. 1969) (government not an intended beneficiary under language of the
insurance policy).
It is crucial to note that this expansion of medical care recovery has not in the past
depended upon the independent cause of action granted to the United States under
the FMCRA, but rather has depended upon the insurance contract between the in-
surer and the injured servicemember.
" Medical payments insurance is an additional coverage available in fault
based jurisdictions which provides medical benefits - to the insured without regard to
fault. Essentially, medical payments insurance is similar to a modest form of no-fault.
insurance utilized in states with add-on insurance plans. See note 2 supra.
" The first case to recognize the third party beneficiary theory for recovery by
the United States was Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 349 F.2d 83
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). The third party beneficiary theory
has been widely approved by courts. United States v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 530
F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1976): United States v. Auto. Club Ins, Co., 522 F.2d I (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co„ 461 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1972);
United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 455 F.2ci 789 (10th Cir. 1972); United
States v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 092 (1971); Hollister v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 192 Neb. 687, 224
N.W.2d 164 (1074). Accord, United States v. Nationwide Mut. Iris. Co., 499 F.2d 1355
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drivers involved in automobile accidents. 48 In addition, the third party bene-
ficiary theory furthered the goals of medical care recovery in situations fall-
ing outside the provisions of the FMCRA. Armed with both the FMCRA and the
third party beneficiary theory, the United States has returned millions of dollars to
the federal treasury that otherwise would have been lost as a windfall to either the
tcifeasor, his insurer or the injured party." Nevertheless, with the enactment of
no-fault insurance laws, the FMCRA has become less effective and perhaps in-
applicable to government attempts to recover medical expense.
I I. EFFECT OF NO-FAULT STATUTES ON
GOVERNMENTAL MEDICAL CARE RECOVERY
The impact of a particular state's no-fault insurance law upon the FMCRA
right of reimbursement depends upon the language of the slate statute. In states
with add-on no-fault plans," the statutes merely require a no-fault coverage in
addition to the usual automobile liability insurance coverages." These states do not
(9th Cir. 1974) (remanded on question of whether United States was an intended third
party beneficiary); United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 421 E. Stipp.
1322 (N.D.N.Y. 1976) (right of recovery as assignee of injured party's claim).
This expansion of medical care recovery depends upon the insurance contract
language rather than the independent right of recovery in the FMCRA. See note 45
supra. In this situation, there is no tortfeasor against whom recovery can be had under
the FMCRA. Typically, the insured is at fault or was involved in a one car accident.
The government asserts a claim as a third party beneficiary of the servicemembees
medical payments insurance which is payable without regard to fault.
See generally Long, Government Recovery Beyond the Federal Medical Recovery Act, 14
S.D. L. Rev. 20 (1969).
48 BerlIZWeig, .supra note 17, at 1262.
4" The combined collections of all government agencies during calendar year
1978 is summarized below:
Claims
Asserted
Amount
Asserted
Claim
Collected
Amount
Collected
Army 4,493 $ 8,170,624.33 3,931 $	 3,911,010.97
Navy 3,269 5,436,075.59 3,649 3,736,411.13
Air Force 6,684 6,688,725.00 5.198 3,740,832.00
VA 3.843 11,291,251.00 .2,312 3,879,088.00
H E W 572 170,215.75 305 560,536.91
Total 18,811 $32,556,891.67 15,395 $15,827,879.01
The total collections for the Medical Care Recovery Act since its inception in 1963
amount to $135,625,775.13. It is interesting to note that the program is based upon
relatively small claims. The average claim asserted is $1,730.73, while the average claim
collected is $1,021. I . Lettei' to the author from Lawrence A. Klinger. Assistant to the
Directors Torts Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (March 10,
1980).
30 See note 2 supra.
51 Eight states have such statutory enactments: ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 66 -4014 to
-4021 (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. 6t. 21, § 2118 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A,
§.§ 538-547 (1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 743.800 to .835 (1977); S.C. CODE §§ 56-11-110
to -250 (1977 & Supp. 1979); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-23-6 to -8 (1978); TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-3 (Vernon Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 38.1-380.1 to -380.2
(Supp. 1979).
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limit the injured person's right to sue the third party wrongdoer for reimbursement
of medical expense." The injured person immediately recovers first party ben-
efits" from the no-fault insurer and, depending upon the statute, may have to
turn over to the insurer any damages awarded for medical expenses in a subsequent
lawsuit against the tortfeasor. 54 The FMCRA right of recompense fits easily into
this type of no-fault system. The FMCRA bases its right of recovery upon "cir-
cumstances creating a tort liability upon some third person." 54 Since under the
add-on no-fault. plan there is no abrogation of tort. liability in the negligent party, the
United States can undoubtedly continue to pursue a claim for reimbursement
under the FMCRA. Additionally, since add-on no-fault insurance is essentially a
traditional fault based system with expanded medical payments insurance," the
United States can utilize the third part.y beneficiary theory to recover outside the
FMCRA in cases where there is no tortfeasor. 57
 The United States can therefore
pursue its FMCRA right and a third party beneficiary theory of recovery in add-on
no-fault. states.
The situation, however, is different in modified or pure no-fault states.
In modified no-fault states," tort liability for economic harm such as medical
expense is often abolished to the extent of no-fault benefits available to the
The Maryland statute is typical: Mn. ANN. CODE art. 48A. § 540 (1979)
provides in pertMent part:
The benefits required under §539 of this article shall he payable without
regard to the fault or nonfault of the named insured or the recipient in
causing or contributing to the accident, and without regard to any collat-
eral source of medical, hospital, or wage continuation benefits.
Section 542 provides:
Nothing in this subtitle shall he deemed to affect the right of any person to
claim and sue for damages or losses sustained by hint as the result of a
motor vehicle accident.
" "First party benefits" refers to whom the insurance company must pay the
benefits. First party no-fault benefits are payable to the insured under the contract.
upon his or her injury in an automobile accident.. These benefits are payable without
regard to the insured's fault. In contrast, third party liability insurance is payable to
parties outside the contractual relationship upon a showing that the insured is liable
for their injuries.
54 See statutes cited at note 51 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1976). The Act was enacted by Congress at a time
when no-fault insurance neither existed in the United States nor was contemplated.
The legislative history of the FMCRA indicates that Congress conditioned the govern-
ment's recovery right upon the third party's tort liability under substantive state law.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 19. at 2640. It seems clear that Congress intended to re-
quire tort liability imposed upon a third person as a vehicle to bring the federal right
of recovery against the person liable under state law for the injured person's medical
expenses. Id. It would seem reasonable to conclude that. Congress had assumed the
continued existence of the fault based system of automobile accident reparations in the
states. it is therefore doubtful that Congress intended to subject the federal right of
recovery to a state law which completely extinguishes the right. See Part III infra.
See note 2 supra.
See notes 46 & 47 supra.
Sec note 2 supra. Fifteen states have modified plans: O .n.o. REV. S•AT. §§
10-4-701 to -723 (i973 & Stipp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STA'r. ANN. §§ 38-319 to -351a
(West Stipp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN, §§ 627.730 to .741 (West 1972 & Stipp. 1979),
repealed, 1976 Fla, Laws ch, 76-168, § 3 (effective date of repeal July I, 1982); GA.
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injured party. 5 " A party in these states, whose medical expenses for injury
are less than the amount of no-fault benefits available under the statute, is
precluded from suing the tortfeasor for economic harm." In pure no-fault
states,"' tort liability for economic harm is completely abolished and the no-
fault insurer is responsible for unlimited benefits."' Thus, in most cases in
these states the injured party can claim recompense only from the no-fault
insurer. The FMCRA still could be applicable in these states since the policy
effectuated by the Act is paramount over state law under the supremacy
clause of theConstitution." 3 ' The underlying intent of Congress was to ex-
tend the right of recovery against the person liable for the injuries under state
law." In fault based jurisdictions, that person has always been the tortfeasor,
while in no-fault jurisdictions, that person is now the no-fault insurer. Logi-
cally, the FMCRA right of recovery should be extended in no-fault jurisdic-
tions. The literal language of the statute, however, provides that the right of
recovery is enforceable only against a third person liable in tort."' Because in
a no-fault state the injured party usually has no rights in tort. which can be
CODE. ANN. §§ 56-34011) tn -3413h, 56-9915.2 (1977 & Supp. 1979); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 294-1 to -41 (1976 & Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1973 & Supp.
1978): Ky. Rev. STAT. §§ 304.39-010 to -340, 304.99-05{) (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch . 90, §§ 34A-340 (West 1975 & Supp. 1979), ch. 231, § 61) (West 1975);
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.14, .41 to .71 (West Supp. 1979); Nev. Rm. , . STAT. §§ 698-
010-.510 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6A-1 to -20 (West 1973 & Supp. 1979); N.Y.
INS. LAW §§ 670-678 (McKinney Stipp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-41-01 to -19
(1978 & Supp. 1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40. §§ 1009.101-.603 (Purdon Supp. 1979);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ '31-41-1 to -13.4 (1974 & Supp. 1979).
'" Monetary thresholds abrogate the right to sue in tort until the threshold
damages are exceeded. Narrative thresholds are based upon a description of the types
of injuries that must occur before the injured person may sue in tort for noneconomic
harm.
Kentucky is typical. Its statute provides both a monetary and narrative threshold:
(a) Tort liability with respect n accidents occurring in this commonwealth
and arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehi-
cle is "abolished- for damages because of bodily injury, sickness or dis-
ease to the extent the basic reparation benefits provided in this subtitle
are payable therefor, ... except to the extent noneconomic detriment
qualifies tinder subsection (2)(b) hereof.
(b) ... a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental
anguish and inconvenience ... in the event ... damages exceed one
thousand dollars ($1,000), or the injury or disease consists in whole or
in Pall of permanent disfigurement, a fracture to a weight-bearing
bone, a compound. comminated, displaced or compressed fracture, loss
of a body member, permanent injury within reasonable Medical proba-
bility, permanent loss of bodily function or cleath.
Ky. Rev. STAT. § 304.39-060(2).
''" See, e.g., id. Some states set a minimum dollar amount less than the amount.
of benefits available to the injured party under the statute which must be exceeded to
sue in tort. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (West 1973).
"' Michigan has essentially a pure no-fault insurance statute: Micu. STAT. ANN.
§ 24.13101 to -13179 (Supp. 1979). See note 2 supra.
62 See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 24.13135 (Supp. 1979).
" Sec text beginning at note 68 infra.
"4 See note 55 supra and text beginning at note 229 infra.
"5 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1976).
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transferred to the United States under this literal language, the recovery right
is arguably extinguished."" The federal right of recovery could fail under
such a system of no-fault automobile accident injury reparations. If courts
refuse to make the United States a federally mandated third party beneficiary
of the no-fault contract under the supremacy of the FMCRA theory, the gov-
ernment still might rely upon a straight third party beneficiary theory under
the state no-fault law. Unlike the supremacy of the FMCRA theory, the suc-
cess of a third party beneficiary theory would depend upon the language in
the no-fault statute. An examination of both theories is important because
unlike in the add-on no-fault states, whether the United States has any right
of recovery in modified or pure no-fault states could depend only upon its
status as a third party beneficiary of the no-fault contract.
The enactment of no-fault insurance laws has created substantial judicial
confusion regarding the interplay between the FMCRA, no-fault insurance
laws and the various methods available to the government. for effectuating
medical care recovery. If the courts misunderstand or reject. these theories of
recovery, the United States may be denied reimbursement in the very same
situations where prior to enactment of state no-fault laws, it could have recov-
ered."' This section will begin by examining the theory that the United
States is a federally mandated third party beneficiary of all no-fault contracts
under the supremacy of the FMCRA over state no-fault statutes. Next it will
look at the utility of a third party beneficiary theory to enable governmental
recovery under state no-fault statutes. Finally, the section will examine judicial
confusion of the interplay between the FMCRA, state no-fault statutes and the
recovery methods used by the United States.
A. The Federally Mandated Third Party Beneficiary
Theory Under the FMCRA
1. United Services Automobile Association v. Holland.
The first court to deal with the question whether the FMCRA right of
recovery is extinguished by abolition of tort liability by•a no-fault statute was
the District Court of Appeals of Florida in United Services Automobile Association
v. Holland." In that case, an injured serviceman who received free medical
care brought suit against his no-fault insurer to recover benefits on behalf of
the United States." The no-fault insurer denied liability for the medical ex-
penses on the basis that it was not required to pay no-fault benefits on behalf
of its insured when a third party is required by law to pay for such ex-
penses!"
The court. held that the enactment of a no-fault insurance law in Florida
would not frustrate the United States' right to reimbursement under the
"" Holman v. United States. 470 F. Stipp. 769, 771 (EA/ Pa. 1979).
17
 The public policy ramifications of permitting state law to cut off the federal
right of recovery is discussed in Section 111 ity'ra.
" 283 So. 2d 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
" 9 Id. at 382.
71 Id. at 384.
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FMCRA." The court reasoned that since the United States had a right of
reimbursement against a tortfeasor under the FMCRA in a fault based state, it
should, by analogy, have a right of reimbursement against the no-fault insurer
under the FMCRA in a no-fault state. 72 That the no-fault insurance law ex-
tinguished liability in a tortfeasor and substituted the no-fault insurer as the
person liable could not defeat the supreme federal right of recovery. 73 Es-
sentially, the court reasoned that the right of reimbursement should follow
the person liable under state law for the injured person's medical expenses. 74
The Holland court's reasoning adapted the FMCRA and the legislative
intent behind the Act to the no-fault reparations system. The court ignored
the literal language of the FMCRA which limits the right of reimbursement to
one against tortfeasors, and instead focused upon the underlying assumption
of Congress that the Act would allow reimbursement from the person liable
for the injured peron's expense under state law. By first declaring that the
Florida no-fault law could not extinguish the FMCRA right of recovery" and
then holding that the United States had a right to recover as a third party
beneficiary of the serviceman's no-fault contract," the Holland court adapted
the reimbursement purpose of the FMCRA to the no-fault insurance system.
There is very little question that the United States is a third party
beneficiary of an insurance contract in a no-fault state. As the Holland court
noted, insurers are well aware when they issue policies to servicememhers that
armed forces personnel and their dependents arc eligible for medical care in
a government hospital." Insurers are also aware of Congress's intent to re-
ceive reimbursement as expressed in the FMCRA. 78 Since the insurance pol-
icy is issued to the servicemember with such knowledge, it would be inequit-
able and unconscionable for the insurer to avoid liability for medical expenses
it would have paid out to or for the insured servicemember but for the gov-
ernment's provision of medical care." The Holland case thus represents judi-
cial recognition of the paramount federal interest in reimbursement over a
state's no-fault insurance law.
2. Hoh man v. United States.
Alf courts, however, have not approached this problem with the same
insight. The court in Hohrnan v. United States" narrowly construed the
FMCRA to allow the Pennsylvania no-fault statute" to extinguish the federal
right of recovery. In that case, an active duty serviceman received extensive
IL Id. at 385.
72 Id. at 385-86.
73 Id.
71 Id.
75
 Id. at 385.
76 Id. at 385-86.
" Id. at 385.
78 Id.
78 Id. at 386.
470 F. Supp. 769 (P.D. Pa. 1979).
"' PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101 - .603 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
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free medical care at an Air Force hospital . 82 Subsequently, he brought an
action to recover from his no-fault insurer the value of the medical care he
received and a declaratory judgment against the United States that it was not.
entitled to no-fault benefits under the FMCRA." The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania quickly disposed of the ser-
viceman's claim for no-fault benefits by finding that the serviceman had suf-
fered no "net loss" as defined under the statute."
With respect to the government's claim for no-fault benefits under the
FMCRA, the court held that since Congress had used language which_ con-
ditioned the right upon tort liability of a third person under state law, the
FMCRA right of recovery could be extinguished by abolition of tort liability by a
state." By a narrow and literal reading of the FMCRA the court denied
no-fault benefits to reimburse the government.
The Hohman decision fails to implement the congressional intent underly-
ing the literal language of the FMCRA. It is submitted that the Hohman court
was incorrect in rejecting the Holland court's reasoning as "[missing] the point
of the FMCRA." 86 The point of the FMCRA is Congress's intent that the
United States can look to whoever is liable for payment of the injured party's
medical expenses under state law." Although Congress conk! not foresee in
1962 that a significant change in some states' tort law would remove the third
person liable in tort and substitute a "person" liable in contract, such a change
should be irrelevant to whether the United States can enforce its right of
recovery under the FMCRA. The independent subrogation of the United
States to the injured party's rights in tort was merely a procedural device
utilized by Congress to effectuate recovery; it was not intended "to alter or
diminish the government's right of recovery." 88
 The United States thus
should be able to receive no-fault benefits from the no-fault insurer who is
liable under state law. Thus it was the Hohman court that missed the point of
82 470 F. Supp. at 770.
"3 Id.
81 Id. at 770-71.
"' Id. at 771-72. The court ignored the legislative intent behind the language
of the Act:
By using the language "under circumstances creating a tort liability" Con-
gress, of its own free will, chose to impose upon the Government's right of
reimbursement a contingency, that contingency being that a third person
must he liable in tort for the Government to be entitled to reimbursement.
By imposing that contingency, Congress rendered the Government's right
to reimbursement subject to the tort law of the several states, and the
changes therein. It logically follows that the right to reimbursement was
therefore subject to possible abolitions of tort liability, such as that which
has occurred in Pennsylvania.
Id.
"" Id. at 771.
" Contra, Hohman v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 769. It is because of such a
narrow reading of the FMCRA that Congress should act to clarify its policy of federal
recovery from those responsible under state law for the injured party's medical ex-
penses. See section III infra.
88 Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1259.
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the FMCRA by ignoring the underlying legislative intent of Congress and
construing the Act strictly and literally. Such a decision represents a Failure by
the court to recognize the paramount Federal interest in reimbursement to the
federal treasury.
B. The Third Party Beneficiary Theory Under State
No-Fault Insurance Laws
As an alternative to the federally mandated third party beneficiary theory
under the FMCRA, courts have allowed recovery of medical expenses paid on
behalf of servicemembers under no-fault insurance policies by application of
traditional third party beneficiary contract doctrines. The general contract
theory of recovery for a third party beneficiary requires that the beneficiary
be an intended beneficiary of the contract rather than an incidental bene-
ficiary.g" An examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract must be made to determine whether the parties
intended any third party beneficiaries." The intended beneficiary need not
be specifically named in the contract nor be identifiable at the time the con-
tract is made; he need only be ascertainable."' Indications of an intent to
make one a third party beneficiary include (I) provisions in the contract creat-
ing rights in the third party, (2) provisions allowing for direct performance by
the promisor to the third party, and (3) the social and legal relationship be-
tween the promisee and the third party. 92
The starting point in determining what rights the United States may have
as a third party beneficiary is the insurance contract. The no-fault statute and
the insurance contract must, be examined together in order to determine
whether the United States is a third party beneficiary." If the United States
falls within language in the statute or contract which grants a right of recov-
ery to the government or allows direct payment by the insurer to the govern-
ment, courts have permitted recovery by the United States. 94 This section
will closely examine the third party beneficiary theory in the light of no-fault
statutes. The section will first examine New York and Colorado where the
courts have allowed third party beneficiary status for the government under
the language of the state no-fault law. Second, it will look at a Pennsylvania
case and statutes from Hawaii and Kansas that are likely to prevent gov-
ernmental recovery under the third party beneficiary theory.
8" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 133 and introductory
note at 286-87 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
"" Id.
"I United States v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 455 F.2d 789, 791 (10th Cir.
1972). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONTRACTS, § 139 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7,
1973).
92	CALAMARI & J. PER1u.o, CONTRACTS § 17-2 (2d ed. 1977).
"3 See Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Rozmyslowicz, 449 F. Supp. 68, 70
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd sub nom. United States v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 605
F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1979).
" See cases cited in notes 14, 45 & 47 supra.
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1. New York and Colorado.
One case, arising in United States District Court for the Western District
of New York, allowed recovery by the United States as a third party bene-
ficiary of the bare language of the insurance policy. In United States v.
Leonard," a serviceman was injured when the automobile he was driving was
struck by a negligent. third party." Leonard, a member of the Coast Guard,
was furnished free medical care by the United States." Leonard commenced
arbitration proceedings under the New York Insurance Law when his no-fault
insurer refused to pay benefits for his medical care." 8
 The United States
instituted an action requesting an injunction to prohibit Leonard from collect-
ing the no-fault benefits and demanding that payment for the reasonable
value of the care be made by the insurer to the United States under the
FMCRA or as a third party beneficiary." Leonard argued that the New
York Insurance Law, by abolishing tort liability for economic loss up to
$50,000, 100 had extinguished the basis for the federal right of recovery under
the FMCRA."' The insurance carrier admitted liability for the medical ex-
penses but had withheld payment pending a determination of the person enti-
tled to the benefits."'
The district court avoided the question whether the government's
FMCRA claim was extinguished under the New York no-fault law and relied
instead upon a third party beneficiary theory. 103
 The court found it. undis-
puted that Leonard was an eligible injured person under the no-fault stat-
ute.104 Further, the court felt it was clear that the United States was a person
who had incurred medical expense within the statutory definition of "basic
economic loss." 1"5 The sole question was whether the obligation of the no-
fault insurer ran to the serviceman who suffered the physical injuries or to
the United States who incurred the medical expense.'" Taking a common
95 448 F. Stipp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
96 Id. at 100.
97 Id.
99 N.Y. IN's. LAW § 675(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
99
 448 F. Supp. at 101.
'" N.Y. INS. LAW § 673(1) & (2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). New York is a mod-
ified no-fault state. Sec notes 2 & 58 supra.
1 °' 448 F. Supp. at 101.
192
 Id. at 100.
" 3 Id. at 101.
104 Id. at 102. N.Y. INS. LAW § 671(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979) provides:
"First party benefits" means payments to reimburse a person for basic
economic loss on account of perscinal injury arising out of the use or oper-
ation of a motor vehicle, less [deductions not applicable to the case].
195 448 F. Stipp. at 102. N.Y. Ixs. LAW § 671(1)(a) (McKinney Stipp. 1979) pro-
vides:
"Basic economic loss" means, up to fifty thousand dollars per person:
(a) all necessary expenses incurred for: (i) medical, hospital, surgical,
nursing, dental, ambulance, x-ray, prescription drug and prosthetic ser-
vices ....
106 448 F. Supp. at 102.
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sense approach to the problem, the court reasoned that a fair interpretation
of the insurance contract required that the insurer's obligation ran to
whomever incurs the medical expense." 7 Although the injured person is
usually the same person who incurs the medical expense, the court concluded
that the statute did not require it. 10" Thus, the court in Leonard concluded
that the United States could recover as a third party beneficiary of the insur-
ance contract.
While the Leonard court based its holding that the United States was a
third party beneficiary upon the insurance policy language, Government
Employees Insurance Co. v. Rozmyslowicz, 199 a decision handed down by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York a month after
the Leonard decision, came to a different conclusion. In construing an insur-
ance policy identical to that construed in Leonard,'" ) the Rozmyslowicz court
held that (I) a third party beneficiary argument for the United States could
not be sustained on the bare language of the policy,'" but that (2) a third
party beneficiary argument for the United States could be sustained by use of
the New York Insurance Law as required to be incorporated into the insur-
ance policy." 2
The facts of the case are comparable to those in Leonard. Rozmyslowicz
was injured in an automobile accident. 13 The United States provided the
medical care, and Rozmyslowicz assigned his claim for medical expenses to the
government." 4 The no-fault insurer brought action in New York state court
asking for a declaratory judgment that neither Rozmyslowicz nor the United
States was entitled to recover no-fault benefits.' The United States re-
moved the action to federal court and counter-claimed against the insurer for
reimbursement for medical expenses out of the no-fault coverage. 1lb
1117 Id .
113 Id. The court stated:
he language of the policy does not limit the right. to reimbursement to
the person sustaining the injury. A fair and sensible interpretation is that
the right to reimbursement extends to whomever incurs the expense on
behalf of the eligible injured person. Although the injured person is nor-
mally the same as the one who incurs the expense, in some instances, as
this case demonstrates, the two are different.
Id.
10" 449 F. Supp. 68 (E.D.N.V. 1978).
1 " Id. at 69. Leonard's no-fault policy provided:
Mandatory Personal Injury Protection
The Company will pay first party benefits to reimburse for basic economic
loss sustained by an eligible injured person on account. of personal injuries
caused by an accident arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehi-
cle.
448 F. Supp. at 102.
' 11 449 F. Stipp. at 69.
" 2 Id. at 70.
" 3 Id. at 69.
114 Id.
115 M.
"" Id. The United States sought removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976).
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The court criticized the Leonard court for holding that the United States
was a third party beneficiary of the insurance policy. The basis of the Rozmy-
slowicz court's criticism was that the insurance policy language required the
basic economic loss to be sustained by the eligible insured person."' Since
Rozmyslowicz, like Leonard, had himself incurred no basic economic loss, the
court ruled that a third party beneficiary theory could not be maintained by
the United States merely on the insurance contract." 8 Thus, under the ser-
viceman's insurance contract, the United States could not recover no-fault
benefits.
The court, however, did not limit its analysis of the third party bene-
ficiary theory to the bare language of the insurance contract. The New
York Insurance.Law also provides that any policy issued to satisfy the re-
quirements of the no-fault law will be construed as if the minimum provisions
required by the no-fault law were embodied in the policy." 9 The Rozmy-
slowicz court then turned to section 672(1) of the no-fault law which requires
that every insurance policy issued in the state contain a provision for payment
of no-fault benefits to "(a) persons, other than occupants of another vehicle or
a motorcycle, for loss arising out of the use or operation in this state of such motor
vehicle ...."' Reasoning that the United States was a person other than an
occupant of another motor vehicle who had sustained a loss arising out of the
use or operation of the insured motor vehicle, the court held that "the United
States may recover under the terms of the Insurance Law which are to be read
into the policy." 121
Upon appeal from the district court decision in Rozmyslowicz, the insurer
argued that even if section 672(1)(a) is read into the policy, the United States
was precluded from recovery because (1) the New York legislature had in-
tended only natural persons to recover no-fault benefits; and (2) the United
States did not suffer the physical injury for which reimbursement. of medical
care is sought.' 22 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected both
arguments as unduly narrow interpretations of the no-fault insurance stat-
ute. 12 ' The court observed that the no-fault. insurance statute was intended
to benefit a broad class of claimants from which the United States was not
excluded by the statute.'" In a manner similar to that of the Leonard court,
the court of appeals concluded that the injured party need not be the same
party who incurs the medical expense. 12 ' The court stated succinctly, "The
broad language of section 672(1)(a) suggests that a third party claimant who
incurs the medical costs of an accident victim may recover those expenses
under this section. " 126
17
 449 F. Supp. at 69.
"" Id. at 69-70.
"" 449 F. Supp. in 70. 1973 N.Y. Laws ch. 13, § 11.
isu N.Y. Inns. LAW § 672(a) (McKinney Stipp. 1979) (emphasis added).
121 449 F. Supp. at 70 (emphasis added).
122
 United States v. Government Employees lns. Co., 605 F.2d 669, 670 (2(1 Cit.
1979) (case renamed on appeal).
123 Id.
124 Id.
123 Id.
126
 Id. at 671.
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The Rozmyslowicz court's reasoning is supported by general concepts of
third party beneficiary contract recovery. 127 The United States' right of re-
covery under the New York no-fault insurance law is based upon a provision
in the contract creating rights in the third party. Such rights are read from
the no-fault statute into the insurance policy as a matter of law under the
Rozmyslowicz decision. Although the district court in Rozmyslowicz was correct to
criticize the Leonard court's reasoning that the United States could recover as a
third party beneficiary of the bare language in the insurance policy, the court
of appeals in Rozmyslowicz agreed with the reasoning of the Leonard court that
the injured person need not be the only person to incur medical expense
under the no-fault statute."" These two cases have strongly established the
government's right to recover no-fault benefits in New York.
In contrast to the decisions under New York no-fault law, which allowed
recovery by the United States as a third party beneficiary of a statutory provi-
sion creating rights in the United States for no-fault benefits, a recent Col-
orado Supreme Court decision, United States v. Criterion Insurance Co.,' 2 " al-
lowed recovery by the United States based upon a statutory provision permit-
ting direct performance by the promisor insurance company to third party
medical care providers, such as the United States."" In Criterion, the United
States filed suit against. Criterion Insurance Company in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado for reimbursement for medical care
it provided Criterion's insured."' The district court ruled that the United
States was not a third party beneficiary of the Colorado no-fault statute," 2
and therefore was not entitled to a cause of action against the insurer. 133 The
United States appealed."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, certified the
question whether the United States was a third party beneficiary under Col-
orado statutes to the Supreme Court of Colorado.' 35 The Supreme Court.
based its decision upon section 10-4-708(2) of the Colorado no-fault statute
which permits direct payment by the insurer to a provider of medical ser-
vices. 13 F' The third party beneficiary right was held to arise out of this sec-
tion, which evidenced a "legislative intent that the provider be a third party
beneficiary ...." 137 The court found Rozmyslowicz, which held that the
127 See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
128 Compare United States v. Leonard, 448 F. Supp. at 102 with United States v..
Government Employees Ins. Co., 605 1'.2d at 671.
12'1
	
Colo. — , 596 P.2d 1203 (1979).
' 3" Id. at 1205 & n.l. For a discussion of general contract. third party bene-
ficiary theory. see notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
"I Id. at 1204.
"2 The Colorado statute is compiled at Cow. R•v. SLAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -723
(1973 K Stipp. 1978).
'33
	 P.2d at 1205.
134 id.
I "5 Id,
13 " Id. Coca. REV. STAT. § 10-4-708(2) (1973) provides:
Benefits provided [for first party benefits] may be paid by the insurer di-
rectly to any person supplying necessary products, services. or accommoda-
tions to the person for whom benefits are required under [this law].
"7 596 P.2d at 1205.
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United States was a third party beneficiary of a no-fault statute, exactly on point
and further cited the Leonard court's reasoning as analogous.' 38 In addition,
the court struck down a clause in the serviceman's insurance contract. which
stated: "This insurance does not apply: (j) to the United States of America or
any of its agencies as an insured, a third-party beneficiary, or otherwise."'•
The court held that such a provision was unenforceable since the Colorado
no-fault insurance law also provided: "Notwithstanding any of its other terms
and conditions, every contract of liability insurance for injury ... shall pro-
vide covet-ages at least as extensive as the minimum coverage required by this
law." H° Since the court had ruled that the no-fault law required the
minimum coverage of first party benefits payable to providers of medical care
as third party beneficiaries, the specific exclusion of the United States in the
policy was read out of the contract as not only being directly contrary to the
statutory language but also inapposite with legislative intent."'
This recent line of well-reasoned opinions indicates that a right of the
United States to recover as a statutory third patty beneficiary should he rec-
ognized under similar statutory schemes. 142 Leonard, Rozmyslowicz and Criter-
ion represent judicial construction of no-fault statutes in only two jurisdictions.
It remains uncertain whether the United States will be found to have a right
of recovery in other jurisdictions with different statutory plans.
2. Pennsylvania, Hawaii and Kansas.
Some no-fault statutes have narrow classes of beneficiaries in comparison
to the New York and Colorado statutes. The right to no-fault benefits under
the Pennsylvania statute is available to "victims" of an automobile accident. 143
"Victim" is defined as "an individual who suffers injury arising out of the
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle .... Such a statutory provision
might suggest a legislative intent to pay benefits only to injured natural per-
sons. This provision, however, must be read in conjunction with the provision
on . payment of no-fault benefits. That section provides that lamn obligation
for basic loss benefits for an item of allowable expense may be discharged by
[the insurer] by reimbursing the victim or by making direct payment to the supplier
or provider of products, services, or accommodations . . . " 145 In the Criterion case,
discussed earlier,"" such statutory language was held to provide a right of
"° Id. at 1205-06.
1311 Id. It 1206.
"° Id. The quoted language is from Como. REV. STAT. § I0-4-711(4)(a) (1973).
' 4 ' 596 P.2(1 at 1206.
'" Other state no-fault laws should allow recovery upon the third party bene-
ficiary theory. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-319(k), -320(a) to (c), -321(a). -328.
-333 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3406b(h) (1977); K Y. REv. STAT. §§
304.39-020(2), (5)(a), (10), -030(1), -040, -100, -110(d), -210 (Stipp. 1978); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 65B.43(10), .44(1), (2), .46(1), .49(2), .50, .54(1) (West Supp. 1979); Nev. REV.
STAT. §§ 698.040, .070(3), .200, .230, .250, .410 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26-41-
03(2), (7), -07, but see 26-41-09(1).
"3
 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.201 (Pardon Supp. 1970).
'' Id. at § 1009.103.
"3 Id. at	 101)0.106 (emphasis added).
1 " Sec text beginning at note 129 supra.
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action by the United States as a third party provider of medical services. In
Heusle v. National Mutual Insurance Co.,'" however, the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania refused to interpret the
Pennsylvania No-Fault Insurance Law to allow recovery by the United States
as a third party beneficiary of the statute.' 48
The court in Heusle apparently focused on what rights the injured ser-
vicemernber had to the no-fault benefits, rather than on what rights the
United States might have as a third party beneficiary under the statute.t 4 "
The court attempted to distinguish Rozmyslowicz by claiming that the Rozmy-
slowicz court relied on the language in the insurance policy to justify its deci-
sion that the government was a third party beneficiary.'•"
The Heusle opinion evidences confusion between the right of the injured
party and the right of the government to recover no-fault benefits. The
United States' right does not, as the opinion implies, hinge upon whether the
servicemember could collect no-fault benefits. Rozmyslowicz was directly on
point. Contrary to the Heusle court's reading of Rozmyslowicz, that case refused
to base a third party beneficiary theory on the insurance policy language but instead
allowed the United States to recover as a third party beneficiary of the New York no-
fault statute."' The Heusle court should have examined the Pennsylvania no-
fault law to determine the government's rights, just as the court did in Rozmys-
lowicz. Thus, although it is not certain that the United States cannot recover as
a third party beneficiary under the Pennsylvania no-fault statute, the Heusle
opinion casts grave doubts on the ability of the United States to obtain reim-
bursement as a third party beneficiary in that state.
Although their statutes have not been construed by the courts, Hawaii
and Kansas are examples of other states which have no-fault laws that nar-
rowly draw the class of no-fault statutory beneficiaries. Hawaii's statute pro-
147 479 F. Stipp. 274 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
148
 Id. at 280.
14" Id. The court denied the servicemember's claim for no-fault benefits upon
PA. STAT. ANN. ;it. 40, § 1009.206:
Net Loss . . . benefits (except the proceeds of life insurance) received by or
available to an individual because of the injury from any government, un-
less the law authorizing or providing for such benefits or advantages makes
them excess or secondary to the benefits in accordance with this act, shall
be subtracted from loss in calculating net loss.
But in considering the United States' rights as a third party beneficiary, the court
continued to focus upon the servicemember's rights:
If Plaintiff's contention [that the government is a third party beneficiary]
were correct, then there would be no purpose to §206 of the Pennsylvania
No-Fault Insurance Act. Plaintiffs would have this Court construe the
Travelers policy to provide payment in the same circumstances in which
the legislature has determined that the no-fault insurer need not pay,
namely when the insured receives government benefits.
479 F. Supp. at 280. It would thus seem that the court failed to consider the United
States' rights under the appropriate subsections of the no-fault law and further, that
the court confused the government's entitlement to benefits with the servicemember's.
For a detailed discussion of this type of confusion, see text beginning m note 157 infra.
15 ° 479 F. Supp. at 280.
151
 449 F. Stipp. 68, 69-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
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vides for payment of no-fault benefits to a person identified by name in the
policy, a spouse, or other relative residing in the same household with the
named insured." Similarly, the Kansas statute provides for payment of
benefits to the named insured, relatives in the same household, persons
operating the insured vehicle or passengers in the vehicle.' 33 Both statutes
state that only the insured injured party may collect no-fault benefits. In the
typical case, a servicemember incurs no medical expense in a government
hospital. The servicemember would not receive no-fault benefits since he can
only recover if the medical expenses are incurred personally. 154
 The United,
States probably would not be a statutory beneficiary because the narrow class
of beneficiaries in each statute does not include third persons who incur med-
ical expense on behalf of or provide medical care to the injured person. Con-
ceivably both the injured servicemember and the government could be denied
no-fault benefits under such statutory schemes.
These statutory plans would not necessarily act as a bar to the recovery of
no-fault benefits. If a court construing such statutes took the approach of the
Leonard court that the statute and insurance policy do not require that the
injured party be the same person who incurs the medical expense, then the
United States might be successful in maintaining its right of recovery.' 55 Also,
narrow statutory language does not preclude a third party beneficiary claim
by the United States under the servicemember's contract. If there is language
in the contract upon which a third party beneficiary theory can be based, the
government may still recover. 15 "
152
 HAW. REV. STAT. § 294-3 (1976) provides:
Right to no-fault benefits. (a) If the accident causing accidental harm occurs
in this State, every person, insured under this chapter, and his survivors,
suffering loss from accidental harm arising out of the operation, mainten-
ance or use of a motor vehicle has a right to no-fault benefits ....
(d) "No-fault insured" means: (I) Person identified by name as an insured
in a no-fault policy ... and (2) ... a spouse or other relative of a named
insured
1.53 KAN. STAT. § 40-3107 (1973) provides:
Every policy of motor vehicle liability insurance issued by an insurer to an
owner residing in this state shall: ... (f) include personal injury protection
benefits to the named insured, relatives residing in the same household,
persons operating the insured motor vehicle and other persons struck by
such motor vehicle ....
154
 Courts, in construing language in medical payments policies, have inter-
preted the word "incurred" to mean "legally liable." Lefebvre v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 23, '259 A.2(1 133 (1969); Irby v. Government
Employees Ins. Co., 175 So. 2d 9 (La. App. 1965); Gordon v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 238
S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509 (1961).
15`'
	 text at notes 107 & 108 supra.
' 3 ' Sec text and note at note 217 infra. This method of recovery is not as secure
as being found a third party beneficiary of the insurance statute for, of course, insur-
ers, can attempt to write such favorable contract language out of the contract. See text
at note 139 supra. A very recent case illustrates how a court can deny recovery under
the supremacy of the FMCRA theory, deny recovery as a third party beneficiary of the
no-fault statute, but then find a possible right of recovery for the United States as a
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It is unlikely, however, that most courts will be as innovative as the
Leonard court. Many courts are more comfortable in deciding cases upon the
narrow, legalistic grounds advocated by insurance companies rather than
upon broad public policy grounds. If the courts interpret such statutes nar-
rowly, in modified no-fault jurisdictions like Hawaii and Kansas which abolish
tort liability, the United States probably would have no recovery. The federal
right under the FMCRA would be extinguished and the third party bene-
ficiary theory would fail.
C. judicial Confusion of Recovery Methods Under State
No-Fault Insurance Laws
Previous subsections have shown how the United States has been allowed
and denied recovery in some no-fault jurisdictions. The government's right of
recovery has also been denied by courts when they confuse the United States'
right of recovery with the servicemember's right. The principal cause of judi-
cial confusion has been the courts' failure to distinguish between a case where
the servicemember attempts to recover no-fault benefits for himself and when
the servicemember attempts to recover no-fault benefits on behalf of the gov-
ernment. When the servicemember brings suit against his no-fault insurer to
recover no-fault benefits for himself, he should be denied because it will
result in a double recovery and quite possibly bar the United States from ob-
taining reimbursement from the insurer. If, on the other hand, the ser-
vicemember represents the claim for no-fault benefits on behalf of the gov-
ernment, he should be allowed to recover because the benefits will be turned
over to the United States to reimburse the treasury.'" A failure to distin-
guish between these two fact patterns could cause a failure of reimbursement
to the United States for the medical care it has rendered. This section will
examine the problem through a discussion of two New Jersey state court deci-
sions. Lapidula v. Government Employees Insurance Go.,'" and Sanner v. Govern-
ment Employees Insurance Co.'" illustrate how such confusion can result in
anomalous outcomes.
Lapidula v. Government Employees Insurance Co. involved the claim of three
plaintiff servicemembers for no-fault benefits from their insurance carrier.'"
Plaintiffs received free medical care for their injuries arising out of au-
tomobile accidents) 4° First, since their losses exceeded the statutory
third party beneficiary of'the insurance contract. It would appear that such a court
goes through this legal gymnastic in order to effectuate the underlying intent of the
FMCRA— a result more easily reached by acceptance of the supremacy of the
FMCRA over state law theory. See United States v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 485 F. Supp.
539 (1).N.I). 1980).
'57 For analogous cases in the medical payments insurance area, see note 41
and cases cited in note 47 supra.
158 146 N.J. Super. 463, 370 A.2d 50 (1977).
' 5" 143 N.J. Super. 462, 363 A.2ci 397 (1976), rev'd, 150 NJ. Super. 488, 376
A.2d 180 (1977), aff'd per curiam, 75 N.J. 460, 383 A.2d 429 (1978).
'"" 146 N.J. Super. at 465 -66, 370 A.2d at 51.
'"' Id. at 466, 370 A.2d at 52.
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threshold for tort liability, each plaintiff brought claims against the third party
tortfeasors. 162 Each plaintiffs' attorney represented the government's medical
care claim under the FMCRA.'" 3 The claims were settled out of court for
less than the full amount claimed and each plaintiff' paid over to the United
States the compromised value of the government's medical care claim.'"
Plaintiffs then brought a separate suit against their no-fault insurer for the
value of their medical care. 165 The plaintiffs did not bring the action on
behalf of the government)" - The insurance company argued that it was not
liable to pay first party benefits since the plaintiffs were not legally obligated
to pay for the medical services rendered by the United States.'" The plain-
tiffs argued that they "incurred" medical expenses within the meaning of the
no-fault statute by paying the government out of the proceeds from the tort
liability settlement with the negligent third parties.'"
The Appellate Division-Part E of the Superior Court of New Jersey first
looked to the New Jersey statute which provided for medical expense benefits.
The statute provided for "[p]ayment of all reasonable medical expenses incur-
red as a result of personal injury sustained in an automobile accident.""" The
court rejected the insurer's argument that the plaintiffs had incurred no med-
ical expense. The court stated:
[The insurer's] thesis that medical expenses were not incurred by
plaintiffs because they were not obligated to pay for the services is
unrealistic and lacks substance. The medical services rendered by the
Government were not gratuitous but were part of the compensation
paid military personnel and their dependents for the services ren-
dered to the armed forces [citations omitted]. In short, the medical
expenses were "incurred" because plaintiffs were liable for such ser-
vices even though someone else was responsible to pay for them.
This approach is supported by the fact that the Government, by law,
was subrogated to plaintiffs' right to recover such medical expenses
from the third-party wrongdoers.""
The court also justified its holding on equitable principles: 7 ' The court
reasoned that the insurer would receive an unwarrantable windfall if the
162 Id. Each plaintiff's damages exceeded the two hundred dollar
threshold enabling them to bring an action in tort. Although New Jersey's
monetary threshold is the lowest of all the states, hospital expenses, X-rays and
other diagnostic medical expenses arc excluded in calculating the threshold
amount. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-8 (\Vest 1973).
113 See 146 N.J. Super. at 466, 370 A.2d at 52. See also notes 38 & 41 and
accompanying text. supra.
1 " Id. at 466, 370 A.2d at 52. The government is permitted to com-
promise the amount of its recovery under 42	 § 2652(b) (1976).
165
 146 N.J. Super. at 466, 370 A.2d at 52.
"" Id. at 467, 370 A.2d at 52.
117 id.
160 Id.
169 Id. at 466, 370 A.2c1 at 52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4(a) (West 1973)
(emphasis added).
17 " 146 N.J. Super. at 467, 370 A.2d at 52.
171 Id.
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plaintiff's were denied recovery of benefits for which they had paid a pre-
mitt in. 172
The court in Lapidtda apparently misunderstood the operation of the
government recovery right. "Incurred" as used in the New Jersey no-fault
statute and in no-fault policies refers to a legal liability owing to the provider
of the medical care. 17 " In this case, notwithstanding what the court found,
there was no legal liability of the plaintiff servicemen and dependents to
repay the United States for the medical care it furnished pursuant to statutory
duty. The government never bills or otherwise seeks payment for medical
expense from the eligible injured servicemember or their dependents. 1 74
Payment for the medical care rendered to beneficiaries of federal medical
care statutes is sought by the United States from the tortfeasor or his insurer
under the FMCRA or from the servicemember's insurance company under a
third party beneficiary theory.
Furthermore, the cou rt's conclusion that the plaintiffs had incurred med-
ical expense under the no-fault. policy was not "supported by the fact that the
government, by law, was subrogated to plaintiffs' right to recover such medi-
cal expenses from the third-party wrongdoers." 175 In this case, the plaintiff's
had no right themselves to plead and recover damages from their tortfeasors
for the medical care because plaintiffs were not liable to the government for
the treatment they received.'" If the court in using the word "subrogated"
meant that the United States "stepped into the shoes" of the injured plaintiffs,
clearly the United States would have had no right to recover the medical ex-
penses because the plaintiffs had no right of recovery against the tortfeasor
for such medical expenses. 177 If the court in using the word "subrogated"
meant that the United States was entitled to recovery of its medical expenses
out of the injured party's damages received from the tortfeasor, the court was
wrong. The United States has no right of action for reimbursement out of the
injured party's recovery from the tortfeasor.'" How then did the govern-
ment in Lapidula protect and ensure its recovery of its medical expenses? Re-
call that the right of recovery under the FMCRA is an independent right,'"
When the United States provides free medical care to an eligible injured per-
son, the United States' independent right of recovery accrues against the
tortfeasor to the extent of the medical care rendered.'"" At the same time
the injured party has a right of action for all other types of tort damages
172 id .
173 150 N.J. Super. 488, 491-92, 376 A.2d 180, 182.
'" See, e.g., Claims for the Reasonable Value of Medical Care Furnished
by the Army, 32 C.F.R. § 537.22(b)(2) (1979).
175 146 N.J. Super. 463, 467, 370 A.2d 50, 52.
17" Lefebvre v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 23, 25, 259
A.2d 133, 135.
177 Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Rozmyslowicz, 449 F. Stipp. at 69.
178 See case cited and accompanying text at note 40 supra.
17" Sec cases cited at note 23 supra.
' 8 " 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (1976). See also authorities cited and accompany-
ing text at note 25 supra.
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except for medical care."' As discussed in Part. I, the United States can bring
an action in its own name. ' "1
The government, however, first. requests the injured party's attorney to
sign a letter of agreement to represent the FMCRA claim on behalf of the
government.'" Such an agreement amounts to a promise by the attorney to
pay over to the government the damages recovered from the tortfeasor for
the medical care.'" In Lapidula, when the government received the settle-
ment damages from the tortfeasors, it was the FMCRA's independent right of
recovery which was asserted against the tortfeasors by the injured parties' at-
torneys on behalf of the United States. Since plaintiffs never had any right of
recovery from the tortfeasors for the medical expenses, they never had any
right to the settlement damages placed in their hands for the benefit of the
United States. Therefore, plaintiffs in Lapidula "incurred" no expense when
they turned over the settlement damages to the government.
Additionally, the denial of no-fault benefits did not amount to a windfall
to the insurance company. The plaintiffs paid premiums under an insurance
contract. which obligated the insurer to pay benefits when the insured or other
eligible person incurred medical expense. The plaintiffs in this case had in-
curred no liability for medical expense to the United States and therefore
were not entitled to recover tinder the policy.
Finally, the plaintiffs in Lapidula received a windfall double recovery. The
United States paid for the cost of their medical care. The reimbursement to
the government by the tortfeasors pursuant to the FMCRA amounted to a
direct payment by the tortfeasor to the plaintiffs for their injuries. In then
claiming and recovering no-fault benefits for medical expenses they never
legally incurred, the plaintiffs received a double recovery contrary to the pol-
icy of the no-fault act.'"
As Lapidula illustrates, it is crucial for a court to determine whether the
plaintiff servicemember is bringing an action for medical expenses under a
no-fault insurance policy for himself or for the benefit of the United States.
Clearly, if the action is brought in order for the servicemember himself to
recover for medical care he was provided free of charge by the United States;
recovery should be denied.' 84; A claim brought against the no-fault insurer
by a servicemember for himself would be a double recovery—possibly at the
expense of the United States. On the other hand, if the action is brought in
order for the servicemember to recover no-fault benefits f'or medical expense
on behalf of the United States, recovery should be allowed if on a third party
beneficiary theory or as a matter, of public policy the United States would
have been entitled to recover had it brought the action in its own name. The
See case cited and accompanying text at note 25 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 2651(b) (1976).
I" See cases cited and accompanying .text at note 41 supra.
"I See Hanley v. Condrey. 467 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1972).
"5 See N. J . STAT. ANN. § 39;6A-12 (West 1973). See also Cirelli v. Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co., 72 N.J. 380, 387, 371 A.2d 17, 21 (1977).
"" United States v, Leonard, 448 F. Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1978); Lefebvre
v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 23, 259 A,2d 133 (1969).
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injured servicemember merely acts as an intermediary between the govern-
ment and the no-fault insurer, pressing the, United States' right of recovery
against the insurer.
Allowing the servicemember to represent the government's medical care
claim furthers a number of desirable goals. First, the private attorney is pro-
hibited by federal law from charging a fee which saves the United States liti-
gation costs normally expended by the United States Attorney to litigate the
claim.'" Also, such a method is consistent with the purposes of no-fault
legislation which seeks to reduce the multiplicity of lawsuits which would
occur if the servicemember's and the government's claims arising out of the
same incident were litigated separately.' 88 Those cases decided under the
FMCRA which allowed the servicemember to represent the governments
claim without the United States joining the action as a named party are
equally applicable to the situation where a servicemember represents the gov-
ernment's claim against a no-fault insurer.'" Thus, it is crucial for a court to
distinguish whether the servicemember is bringing a no-fault claim for medi-
cal expenses on behalf of himself or on behalf of the United States.
Another example of a failure to make such a crucial distinction is Sanner
v. Government Employees Insurance Co.'"" In that case, the serviceman, Sanner,
was injured while on active duty for the National Guard."' Medical care was
provided or paid by the United States.'" Sanner brought an action against
the alleged tortfeasors "3 and subsequently filed a claim with his no-fault in-
surer for the value of his medical expenses.'" The insurance company de-
nied the benefits principally for the same reason as the insurer in Lapidula —
the serviceman had legally incurred no medical expense under the no-fault
policy."' The trial court reasoned that there was no real difference between
a medical insurance policy and the medical benefits provided to Sanner pur-
suant to federal statute.'" The trial court then held that. Sanner could re-
cover benefits under a statutory provision stating that no-fault benefits are
payable without regard to collateral sources such as medical insurance
policies."' Additionally, the trial court relied on Holland which allowed a
serviceman to recover no-fault benefits on behalf of the government."' At. the
end of the trial court opinion, the court observed in dicta:
'87 Bernzweig, supra note 17, at 1270 & n.86.
1" See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.39-010(5)(6) (Stipp. 1979). See also MINN.
S•AT. ANN. § 65B.42(4) (West Supp. 1980).
1" Sec cases cited at note 41 supra.
19" 143 N.J. Super. 462. 363 A.2d 397 (1976), rev'd, 150 NJ. Super. 488,
376 A.2d 180 (1977), alid per curium, 75 N.J. 460, 383 A.2d 429 (1978).
''' 150 N.J. Super. at 490. 376 A.2d at 181.
192 ht
hi. at 490-91, 376 A.2d 182. Sanner's injuries exceeded the statutory
threshold for suing in tort under the New Jersey law. See note 162 supra.
194 I SO N.J. Super. at 490, 376 A.2d at 181-82.
1515 Id.
'm 143 N.J. Super. 462, 466-67, 363 A.2d 397, 400.
117 hi. at 466, 363 A.2d at 399-400.
198 Id. at 467. 363 A.2d at 400.
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While the issue is not specifically raised by the pleadings, plaintiff
would be entitled to bring . this suit for the benefit of the United
States Government.
Clearly plaintiff in this action would be entitled to recover from
the insurer for the benefit of the Government the reasonable value
of medical services.' 99
Thus, the trial court apparently granted recovery of no-fault benefits to San-
ner although he legally incurred no medical expenses and he brought the suit.
for no-fault benefits on his own behalf. The insurance company appealed.
The Appellate Division-Part B of the Superior Court of New Jersey re-
versed the lower court decision. 200 The appellate court based its decision
upon Sanner having incurred no medical expense."' The court rejected the
trial court's reliance on the statutory collateral source provision as completely
irrelevant- to the question of the insurer's initial liability under the no-fault
statutes. 2 U 2 The court concluded the collateral source provision played no
role in determining whether the plaintiff had incurred medical expense in the
first place." 3 The court also wanted to avoid a double recovery by the ser-
viceman. The court stated:
Were the judgment by the trial court to be affirmed, plaintiff would
be in possession of funds representing the value of the treatment
afforded him although without liability to the federal government
therefor. We cannot conceive of the public interest to be served by
such a result."'
The court's opinion went on to discuss the interplay between the federal gov-
ernment's right of recovery under the FMCRA and the no-fault law as if San-
ner had brought the action on the government's behalf. 2 " 5 The appellate
court opinion was thus ambiguous on the crucial issue of whether Sanner
brought the action for no-fault. benefits on behalf of himself or on behalf of
the government. 21" The ambiguity is apparent upon close examination of
' 9 " Id. at 468, 363 A.2d at 401.
211" 150 NJ. Super. 488. 370 A.2d 180 (1977).
2" hi. at 491, 376 A.2d at 182. The court emphasized that:
Idhe critical question here is whether plaintiff "incurred" expenses
fur medical treatment in light of the fact that he neither paid for
them nor became liable to pay for them.... a no fault" carrier's
liability for medical expenses is triggered by the insured incurring
them, that is. either paying them or becoming liable to pay for them.
If he neither pays the expenses nor becomes liable to pay them, we
fail to see how it can he said, with any degree of realism, that he has
incurred such expenses.
Id.
"= Id. at 493, 376 A.2d at 183.
203 Id .
Id. at 492-93. 376 A.2d at 183 (court's footnote omitted).
2" Id. at 493-97, 376 A.2d at 183-85.
26" United States v. Auto. Club Ins. Co., 522 F.2d 1 (5t.h Cir. 1975), illustrates
why the issue is crucial to the outcome of a governmental recovery case. In that case,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted summary
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both the trial court and appellate court opinions in the Sanner case. The trial
court opinion discusses in purely theoretical terms the possibility that Sanner
could have brought the medical expense claim on behalf of the govern-
ment.217 In contrast, the appellate court decision casts doubts as to whether
it considered the case as one brought by Sanner for himself. The appellate
court stated: "Although the trial court opinion suggests that plaintiffs recov-
ery of medical expenses is to be for the government's benefit ... the final
disposition places no such limitation on plaintiff's entitlement to the funds
representing medical treatment ...." 208 Later in the opinion, the appellate
court alludes again to the idea that it. was dealing with the case as one involv-
ing a government claim for no-fault benefits through Sanner's representation
of its claim. The court noted: "WTI its essential elements this case involves a ,
contest between an insurance carrier and the Federal Government "209
Despite this confusing language in the appellate court opinion, it is likely that
the action was brought by Sanner for himself."' The action apparently was
not brought by Sanner on behalf of the United States.
The appellate court in the Sanner case was apparently correct in reversing
the trial court. Like the Lapidula case, Sanner legally incurred no obligation to
pay the United States for his medical care. The statutory collateral source
provision"' relied upon by the trial court had no relevance in determining
whether Sanner was initially entitled to the no-fault benefits. Until Sanner
could be found entitled to recover no-fault benefits, the collateral source pro-
vision would not come into play. Additionally, the appellate court was prop-
erly concerned with avoiding a double recovery by the plaintiff as had oc-
curred in the Lapidula case. All of this reasoning provided an adequate basis
for the appellate division to resolve the only proper question presented in the
judgment in favor of a medical payments insurer who had been sued by the United
States as a third party beneficiary of an insurance contract. Id. at 2. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court upon the basis that
there is an important distinction between suits brought by the United States for reim-
bursement and suits brought by servicemembers for benefits:
The Louisiana state court cases relied upon by the district court, Irby v.
Government Employees Insurance Co., 175 So.2d 9 (La.Ct. App. 1965), and
Drearr v. Connecticuit General Life Insurance Co., 119 So.2d 149 (La. Cr.. App.
1960), are inapposite and clearly distinguishable. In each of these cases a
serviceman, after receiving free medical care from the Government, person-
ally sought recovery under the policy. The Louisiana courts held that the
servicemen could not recover, apparently on the theory that recovery
would be a "windfall" to the serviceman since he had not incurred the
expenses. In the instant case, however, it is the United States who seeks
recovery for expenses incurred, not the insured.
Id. at 3 (emphasis supplied).
2"7 143 N.J. Super. at 468, 363 A.2d at 401. See text at note 199 supra.
2 "" 150 N.J. Super. at 492 ri.1, 376 A.2d 183 n.1 (citation omitted).
211 " Id. at 496, 376 A.2d at 185.
21 " 143 N.J. Super. at 463-64, 363 A.2d at 398. "This matter comes before the
court on a stipulated set of facts and, by consent of the parties, is being treated as a
declaratory judgment action to determine plaintiffs rights under the [no-fatilt insurance
contract]." Id. (emphasis added).
211
 N.I. STAT. ANN.	 39:6A-6 (West 1973).
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case: whether the serviceman was entitled to recover for himself no-fault
benefits for medical care he did not legally incur.
Despite the appellate court's decision to deny no-fault benefits to Sanner
for himself, the extensive discussion of the government's right of recovery was
unfortunate dicta. The opinion evidences the court's failure to perceive both
the third party beneficiary theory and the mechanics of the FMCRA right of
recovery. The appellate court, in its opinion, asserted that "if there was no
tortfeasor, or if the serviceman's own negligent conduct produced his injuries,
the Federal Government could not recover for the value of the treatment
a [forded. " 212 The third party beneficiary theory, however, enables the
United States to recover medical expense where there was no tortfeasor or the
injured party was at fault. 213
 The federal government recovers hundreds of
thousands of dollars every year as a third party beneficiary of medical pay-
ments and no-fault insurance. 214 Such recovery is made in the absence of a
tortfeasor and with -out regard to the fault of the servicemember.
Another indication that the court was not cognizant of the third party
beneficiary theory was its assertion that the United States would have had no
right to the no-fault benefits if Sanner asserted the claim on the government's
behalf. The court was concerned that there was no limitation on Sanner's
entitlement to keep the no-fault benefits for himself. Additionally, the court
apparently believed that the United States was not entitled to no-fault bene-
fits. The court stated:
Moreover, we doubt the validity or wisdom of a limitation conferring
on the Government a right to the funds which it would not otherwise
possess. As noted ... we do not regard the insurer as a tortfeasor
within the meaning of the Government's right to subrogation created
by 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2651-2653, and fail to perceive the necessity for confer-
ring upon the Government a right which it has not secured for itself. 215
Obviously, the government does "otherwise possess" a right to no fault be-
nefits under a third party beneficiary theory. As discussed earlier, such a right
arises out of the insurance statute, insurance contract or the FMCRA; it does
not have to be independently "secured" by the government.
Had the court been aware of the third party beneficiary theory and had
Sanner brought the no-fault claim on behalf of the government, the United
States would have been entitled to recover under the insurance policy.'" San-
ner's no-fault policy contained a clause allowing direct performance of the
contract by the insurer to the provider of medical care."' As discussed ear-
212 150 Super. at 490, 376 A.2d at 182.
213 Sec cases cited and accompanying text at note 47 supra.
214 See note 49 supra.
215
 150 N.J. Super. at 492-93 n.1, 376 A.2d at 183 n.! (emphasis added).
21n appellate court opinion went to great lengths to criticize the Holland
case relied upon by the trial court. Such criticism was unnecessary because Sanner
could be distinguished from Holland on the facts. Holland brought his action against
the no-fault insurer on behalf of the United States. Sanner did not.
217
	 no-fault policy provided:
Payment of Personal Injury Protection Benefits. Medical expense benefits and es-
sential services benefits may be paid at the option of the Company to the
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tier, in United States v. Criterion Insurance Co.at" a provision entitling such direct
performance to providers of medical care creates a right of action in such
third parties.
Finally, the court's opinion implies that the government may obtain re-
compense only under its FMCRA right when the injured party could recover
damages in an action against the tortfeasor. 2 " This is simply untrue. The
government's recovery right under the FMCRA is not one of subrogation to
the injured party's damages received from the tortfeasor; 220 it is a subrogation
to the injured party's rights against the tortfeasor under substantive state
law. 22 ' The appellate court failed to recognize that when the injured party
represents the government's claim, he is not pleading his own claim but a
claim based upon the government's rights. In a tort suit brought by the in-
jured party representing the government's claim, it is irrelevant whether the
injured party could introduce the medical expense evidence. What is relevant
is whether the United States could do so if it brought the suit as a named
party. Since the United States could have introduced the evidence had it rep-
resented its claim before the court—it had received no no-fault benefits—the
injured party representing the government's claim before the court could in-
troduce the medical expense evidence in court on behalf of the government.
The appellate court did not properly comprehend the mechanics of the
FMCRA in conjunction with the state no-fault law.
The implication of the Sanner decision is that unless the servicemember
incurs the medical expense, the government does not have a right to no-fault
benefits. Such an interpretation is improper, however, since the government's
entitlement to no-fault benefits does not depend upon whether the ser-
vicemember incurred medical expense. The government's entitlement de-
pends upon whether it incurred medical expenses itself on behalf of the in-
jured party. The only question properly before the court was whether the.
serviceman was entitled to recover no-fault benefits. The entire discussion of
the government's rights of recovery, based upon apparent dicta in the trial
court opinion, was entirely irrelevant to the decision. The Sanner court prop-
erly denied the serviceman no-fault benefits; anything beyond the reasoning
necessary for that holding was clearly unfortunate and contrary to a proper
interpretation of the government's right of recovery.
eligible injured person or the person or organization furnishing the products
or services for which such benefits are due.
Brief for Appellant, appendix 4, Sanner v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 150 N.J.
Super. 488, 376 A.2d 180 (1977).
2 I H - C010. - 59ti P.2d 1203 (1979).
21 " 150 N.J. Super. at 495, 376 A.2d at 184. The court asserted that:
[i]f, however, the insurer were to be held liable to pay its insured for medi-
cal expenses not incurred, then the insured may not introduce into evi-
dence in the liability trial against the tortfeasor evidence of the amounts
collected or collectible, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-12; no recovery can be had therefor
and the Federal Government's right to subrogation will be, by those means,
thwarted ....
Id.
22" See United States v. Ammons, 242 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. Fla. 1965).
221 See cases cited and accompanying text at note 25 supra.
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D. Federal Medical Care Recovery: An Uncertain Future
The foregoing examples illustrate the varied impact of no-fault legislation
upon the FMCRA and upon the government right of recovery unde -r related
doctrines. In some states the right of recovery under the FMCRA is arguably
extinguished clue to abrogation of tort liability for automobile accidents. In
those states, whether the United States may successfully recover medical ex-
penses is contingent upon courts' acceptance of either the supremacy of the
FMCRA theory or a no-fault statutory third party beneficiary theory. Thus
far, one court has adopted the supremacy of the FMCRA approach. But even
if a court rejects this theory, the statutory third party beneficiary theory offers
an alternative grounds for recovery as illustrated by cases based upon the
New York and Colorado no-fault statutes. The statutory third party bene-
ficiary theory is disadvantaged, however, in that its success is dependent upon
the wording of each no-fault state's statute. Pennsylvania, Hawaii and Kansas
offer examples of statutes that narrowly define the class of beneficiaries enti-
tled to benefits which could foreclose governmental recovery of medical ex-
pense. Finally, judicial confusion regarding the operation of the various
theories of government recovery as illustrated by the Lapidula and Sanner
cases can lead to further impairment of the federal policy of reimbursement
underlying the FMCRA.
Pennsylvania stands as an example of the anomaly created when courts
fail to recognize the vitality of the FMCRA policy. As a result of the Holman
decision which rejected the supremacy of the FMCRA theory and the Heusle
decision which apparently rejected the statutory third party beneficiary
theory, the United States is unable to collect reimbursement in the very same
situation where it could collect before enactment of the Pennsylvania no-fault
law. The intent of Congress to be recompensed when beneficiaries of federal
medical care statutes are injured in automobile accidents has been frustrated
by state no-fault insurance laws.
III. THE CLASH OF GOVERNMENT RECOVERY AND NO-FAULT:
SOME SOLUTIONS
The clash of the governmental recovery right and no-fault insurance laws
illustrated in Section II presents a serious conflict between federal and state
law. When servicemembers are involved in automobile accidents, the compet-
ing interests of the federal government and the states must be balanced care-
fully. The federal interests in this situation were identified by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California.'" The
Court held that the question of liability for reimbursement is one of federal
fiscal policy rather than one of special or peculiar concern to the states. 223
222 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
223 Id. at 311. The Court rejected the argument that the rights of federal reim-
bursement were subject to state law under the Erie decision. Instead, the Court held
that the federal judicial power was still available to decide "essentially federal matters,
even though Congress has not acted affirmatively about the specific question." Id. at
307-08.
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This was especially true with respect to the special relationship that exists be-
tween a government and its soldiers. 224 Furthermore, the Court emphasized
that national uniformity of such federal right of reimbursement was an im-
portant reason why the federal right should not be determined by various
state laws. 225 Obviously, therefore, the federal interest in reimbursement
weighs heavy in the balance.
States, on the other hand, have important interests in modifying the tra-
ditional tort liability system with a no-fault. system of automobile accident injury
reparations. States seek to use their no-fault statutes to insure a fast, uniform,
comprehensive and low-cost system for compensating automobile accident vic-
tims and their survivors. 226 Thus, it is important that any solution' to this
problem consider not only the federal government's interest in reimburse-
ment to the treasury and in the continued vitality of the FMCRA, but also the
states' interest in a fast, comprehensive and fair system of automobile insur-
ance. The following discussion will present a judicial and a legislative solution,
either of which should enable a proper balancing of the federal and state
interests. The first subsection will examine three possible judicial interpreta-
tions of the FMCRA, each considered in light of the federal and state interests
at stake. The second subsection will propose an amendment to the FMCRA
which would legislatively balance these interests.
A. Judicial Extension of the FMCRA
A court. faced with construing the FMCRA in conjunction with a state
no-fault law is faced with three possible interpretations: (I) that the FMCRA
pre-empts the state no-fault law, (2) that the state no-fault law extinguishes
the federal recovery right, or (3) that the FMCRA right of recovery is ex-
224 Id. at 305-06. The Court noted that:
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinc-
tively federal in character than that between it and members of the armed
forc'es. To whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations be-
tween soldiers or others in the armed forces and persons outside them or
nonfederal governmental agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and_
consequences of the relation between persons in service and the Govern-
ment are fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by
federal authority .... Since also the Government's purse is affected, as well
as its powers to protect the relationship, its powers, to the extent they are
available to protect it against financial injury, add their weight to the mili-
tary basis for excluding state intrusion.
225 Id. at 310. The Court held that:
tS]tate law should not be selected as the federal rule for governing [a gov-
ernmental right to reimbursement]. Not only is the government-soldier re-
lation distinctively and exclusively a creation of federal law, but we know of
no good reason why the Government's right to be indemnified in these
circumstances, or the lack of such a right, should vary in accordance with
the different rulings of the several states, simply because the soldier
marches or today perhaps as often flies across state lines.
2211 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.102 (Purdon Supp. 1980).
Id.
Id.
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tended against the person liable for the injuries under state law. Each in-
terpretation strikes a different balance between the federal and state interests
involved.
An interpretation that the FMCRA pre-empts the state no-fault law would
violate the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of its automobile insur-
ance reparations system. If pre-emption were allowed by a court, the state
court system would be forced to litigate issues of fault in order to determine if
the third party was a tortfeasor. After a determination of fault, the FMCRA
recovery right would attach to the forced judicial determination of tort liabil-
ity. Obviously, such an interpretation of the FMC:RA would not be appro-
priate in accommodating the state interest in eliminating determination of
fault prior to compensating automobile accident victims.
An interpretation that the state no-fault law extinguishes the federal re-
covery right would not only frustrate the paramount federal interest in ob-
taining reimbursement to the federal treasury, but would also frustrate uni-
form application of the federal right of recovery. For example, in Ohio, cur-
rently a fault based state, the United States could obtain reimbursement if a
servicemember sustains injury in an automobile accident on the Ohio side of
the border but if the same servicemember crossed the border to the Pennsyl-
vania side the state no-fault law would preclude government recovery. 227 Uni-
form application of the FMCRA would be frustrated.
Furthermore, the denial of reimbursement to the United States would
result in a forced subsidy to no-fault insurance companies and perhaps to
(heir insureds. If the United States cannot enforce its recovery right against a
no-fault insurer, the government will be forced to absorb the cost of medical
care for which the no-fault insurer otherwise would have been liable. Such
subsidization would occur randomly since the indirect "payment" to the insur-
ance industry would occur each time a servicemember or dependent was in-
volved in an automobile accident in a no-fault state and received government
medical care. States with fault based systems would receive no such subsidiza-
tion. The result would be that in fault, based states drivers would pay pre-
miums for the "true" cost of operating such a reparation system, but in no-
fault states either drivers would pay premiums lower than the "true" cost of
operating the system or the insurance companies would keep windfall pro-
fits.228 The state's interest in operating a no-fault insurance system should
not frustrate important. federal interests. One of the arguments pressed in
congressional hearings against the enactment of a national no-fault insurance
system was that the states should be free to experiment with various no-fault
plains.'-27 Certainly, the state no-fault laws and the FMCRA should not be
interpreted to allow experimentation which results in subsidization of some
state no-fault systems and the insurance industry.
227 See note .225 supra.
228
 Such a subsidy would not be small. Each year the United States provides
millions of dollars of medical care for injuries arising out of automobile accidents. See.
e .g
., note 49 .supra.
22"
 Proposed Federal No-Fault Statute: hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate judicial) ,
Comm., 93d Cong.. 1st	 2c1 Scss. 1434 (t 73 - 1 974) (letter of Nebraska Bar Ass'n).
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The final interpretation of the FMCRA properly balances the federal and
state interests and carries out the underlying congressional intent. Clearly,
when Congress enacted the FMCRA in 1962, it intended to devise a method
of recovery which would allow reimbursement from the person liable under
state law for the injured party's medical expenses. Congress apparently con-
ditioned this right in the FMCRA on tort liability in a third person because
every state law at that time held tortfeasors liable for the injured party's in-
juries. Thus, until the enactment of no-fault legislation, the FMCRA was uni-
formly applied under the substantive tort law of each state to obtain reim-
bursement from the person liable for the medical expenses.
In order to judicially extend the right of recovery expressed in the
FMCRA under a no-fault statute, courts should extend the FMCRA right
against the person liable for the injured party's medical expenses under state
no-fault. law: the no-fault insurer. The main difference between the two sys-
tems of automobile accident injury reparations is that in a fault based system
•the injured person looks in tort to the wrongdoer for damages and in a no-fault
system the injured person looks in contract to his insurer for benefits. A logical
extension of the legislative intent embodied in the FMCRA would he to allow
equitable subrogation of the United States to the injured party's rights against
the no-fault insurer as a third party beneficiary.
The extension of a right of action by the United States against a no-fault
insurer should not be precluded merely because Congress has failed to amend
the FMCRA. The Supreme Court in 1949 in the Standard Oil Co. case ruled
that no federal common law right of reimbursement existed against the
tortfeasor. The Court noted that it was up to Congress to create legislatively
such a right of action.23" Today, that congressional mandate exists in the
FMCRA: the United States should receive reimbursement from the person
liable under state law. In fault based states, the government has a right of
action against the third party wrongdoer; in no-fault states the government
should have a comparable right of action against the third party insurer.
Thus, the best accommodation of both federal and state interests is an in-
terpretation of the FMCRA that judicially extends the federal right of recov-
ery against a no-fault insurer.
B. Amendment of the FMCRA
Although an amendment to the FMCRA should not be necessary to ex-
tend the federal right of reimbursement in no-fault states, such an amend-
ment would definitively establish the right of recovery in no-fault jurisdic-
tions. Such an amendment should ensure government recovery with as little
impact upon state law as possible, and should be designed to fit uniformly
into states' no-fault systems. Like the independent right that attaches to the
victim's tort. right under the present Act, Congress will want to attach an in-
dependent right to the victim's contractual right against the insurer. It is
proposed that an amendment. to the Act should allow an independent right of
subrogation by the United States in "circumstances creating a tort or contrac-
130
 332 U.S. 3W (1947).
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tual liability upon some third person or insurer" to the injured party's rights
in contract against the insurer. The Act should be amended to achieve these
goals by providing:
§ 2651 (a) In any case in which the United States is authorized or
required by law to furnish hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care
and treatment (including prostheses and medical appliances) to a
person who is injured or suffers a disease, after the effective date of
this Act, under circumstances creating a tort or contractual liability
upon some third person or insurer (other than or in addition to the
United States and except employers of seamen treated under the
provisions of section 249 of this title) to pay damages or benefits
therefor, the United States shall have a right to recover from said
third person or insurer the reasonable value of the care and treat-
ment so furnished or to be furnished and shall, as to this right be
subrogated to any right. or claim that the injured or diseased person,
his guardian. personal representative, estate, dependents, or sur-
vivors has against such third person or insurer to the extent of the
reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished or to he
fu rnished.
This amendment would result once again in a uniform application of the fed-
eral right of recovery in both no-fault and fault based jurisdictions. In no-
fault states, the government would recover as a federally mandated third
party beneficiary of the no-fault contract.. In fault based jurisdictions, in addi-
tion to its rights in tort, the government would recover as a federally man-
dated third party beneficiary of uninsured and medical payments policies."'
The proposed amendment would merge the informal recovery technique of
the third party beneficiary theory with the formal FMCRA right which has
existed since enactment. It. would balance the competing federal interests in
reimbursement with only small impact. upon state law. The greatest impact
upon state law would be striking any restrictions which in the past have frus-
trated the third party beneficiary theory in some states.
CONCLUSION
The federal right of reimbursement. has been jeopardized in recent years
due to the enactment of no-fault insurance laws in some states. These enact-
ments and the judicial confusion regarding the applicability of the FMCRA in
no-fault states have caused a severe interference with the uniform application
of the federal recovery right. With judicial innovation in the application of the
present FMCRA or an amendment of the FMCRA, it is hoped that a more
consistent reimbursement can be made to the federal treasury for the losses
which result when servicemembers or their dependents are involved in au-
tomobile accidents.
DANIEL E. WRIGHT
"' See note 44 supra.
